An anti-spam measure that is used by a very small number of people is that of verifying the sender address by connecting to the sending mail server. For example when I send mail from firstname.lastname@example.org the receiving machine will connect to my mail server and see whether it accepts mail addressed to email@example.com and will reject my mail if that isn’t the case.
The problem with this is that if I try to send mail to someone who has their mail server listed as a SPAM source then their efforts to verify my email address will fail and then my message to them will bounce with a confusing error message. This means that if one of the two mail servers involved in the communication is listed in a DNSBL or RHSBL service then all communication will be impossible. There will not be an option for one person to say “please phone me on this number if you can’t send me an email”.
This happened recently when someone from Italy asked me a question about SE Linux. So I will answer here (maybe they read my blog). In any case the answer might be of general interest:
Firstly I have to note that I have a B.Sc degree and no post-graduate qualifications, so it is not accurate to address me as Dr. Coker.
The question is: Let’s imagine a user acquire root rights. Especially on Fedora Core, which modify su command to map it to sysadm_r role, couldn’t he/she simply disable SELinux, delete logs, and so on?
If a user obtains ultimate privileges then they can do all things including deleting logs etc.
One thing to note is that there is no need for any process other than kernel threads to have ultimate privs, it would be useful in some situations to make log files append-only for all processes and the SE Linux policy language supports this.
The nearest any release policy comes to implementing such things is the separation between sysadm_r and secadm_r in the MLS policy in recent versions of Fedora.
Also note that it is possible to configure a SE Linux policy that does not permit any process to request that a new policy be loaded, the policy files be changed on disk, or the use of programs such as debugfs. Using SE Linux to enforce a policy that can not be bypassed by anything less than booting from installation media is quite easy to achieve.
One idea that I had was to have GPG implemented in the system BIOS and have GPG checks performed on the kernel before it’s loaded (to verify that the kernel had not been modified). The kernel could be passed a decryption key for the root filesystem by the BIOS, and SE Linux would be enabled as soon as the root filesystem was mounted. Thus nothing less than disassembling the BIOS would allow a hostile person to access the data on the disk. This is all possible with technology that has been common for many years. I almost convincced a BIOS author to implement this in about 2002.