Linux, politics, and other interesting things
On the 1st of August I noticed that the server which runs my blog among other things was having an occasional SEGV from a sshd process. Unfortunately I was busy and didn’t pay much attention to this, which turned out to be a big mistake.
On the 12th of September I started investigating this properly and noticed that when someone tried to connect to ssh with password authentication sshd would SEGV after it was denied access to a shared memory region or a semaphore which had a SE Linux type of unconfined_t. I added some SE Linux auditallow rules and discovered that the memory region in question was created by the ssh client. Shortly after that I came to the conclusion that this wasn’t some strange feature of ssh (or one of the many shared objects it uses) but hostile activity. The ssh client appeared to be storing passwords that it used in a shared memory region and sshd was also collecting passwords in the same region and presumably offering them to a ssh client which uses some extension to the ssh protocol.
The sshd process was crashing because it couldn’t handle EPERM on access to shared memory or semaphores. Presumably if the system in question wasn’t running SE Linux then the exploit would have remained undetected for a lot longer.
At this stage we don’t know how the attacker got in. Presumably one of the people with root access ran a ssh client on a compromised system and had their password sniffed. One such client system was mysteriously reinstalled at about that time, the sysadmin of the system in question claimed to have no backups which made it impossible to determine if that system had been compromised. I believe that the sysadmin of the client system knew that their system was compromised, kept that information secret, and allowed other systems to become and remain compromised.
The attacker made no good effort to conceal their presence, they replaced ssh, sshd, and ssh-add and didn’t bother changing the Debian checksums so the debsums program flagged the files as modified. Note that I have kept copies of the files in question and am willing to share them with anyone who wants to analyse them.
By the evening of the 13th of September I had the system mostly working again. Jabber still isn’t working because ejabberd is difficult to get working at the best of times, I am now investigating whether there is a better Jabber server to use, but as I don’t use Jabber often this hasn’t been a priority for me.
Some of the WordPress plugins I use and all of the WordPress themes that are installed were outside the Debian packaging system, as I couldn’t be sure that they hadn’t been altered (because the people who wrote WordPress plugins don’t keep old versions online) I had to upgrade to the newer versions. Of course the newer versions weren’t entirely compatible so I had to use a different theme and I couldn’t get all plugins working. Link Within no longer works, not that it ever worked properly , I wanted to try Outbrain again but their web site won’t let me login (and they haven’t responded to my support request). Does anyone know of a good WordPress plugin to provide links to related content? Either related content on my blog or on the Internet in general will be OK.
Some people have asked me about the change in appearance of my blog. It was simply impossible (for someone with my PHP skills) to get my blog looking the same way as it did before the server was cracked. I think that the new look is OK and don’t mind if people think it looks likw a VW advert – VW make great cars, I was very satisfied with the VW Passat I used to drive.
I had bought some Yubikeys (USB devices that generate one-time passwords)  to control access to that server, if I had configured the software to use them then this might not have happened. The use of one-time password devices can prevent passive password-sniffing attacks. It would still allow active attacks (such as using ControlPath/ControlMaster options on the ssh client to allow a hostile party to connect later (EG the -M, -S, and “-o ControlPersist” options for the ssh client). It’s a pity that there doesn’t seem to be a way to configure the ssh server to disable ControlMaster.
It would be good to have some changes to sshd to allow more restrictions on what a client can request, as ControlMaster functionality isn’t needed by most users it should be possible to disable it.
SE Linux doesn’t protect against a compromised client system or any other way of stealing passwords. It did do a good job of stopping Ebury from doing all the things it wanted to do and thus making me aware of the problem. So I count this as a win for SE Linux.
Yubikeys are the cheapest and easiest way of managine one-time passwords. I had already bought some for use on the system in question but hadn’t got around to configuring them. I have to make that a priority.
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