Linux, politics, and other interesting things
A recent development in SE Linux policy is the concept of UBAC (User Based Access Control) which prevents SE Linux users (identitied) from accessing each other’s files.
SE Linux user identities may map 1:1 to Unix users (as was required in the early versions of SE Linux), you might have unique identities for special users and a default identity for all the other users, or you might have an identity per group – or use some other method of assigning identities to groups.
The UBAC constraints in the upstream reference policy prevent a process with a SE Linux identity other than system_u from accessing any files with an identity other than system_u. So basically any regular user can access files from the system but not other users and system processes (daemons) can access files from all users. Of course this is just one layer of protection, so while the UBAC constraint doesn’t prevent a user from accessing any system files the domain-type access controls may do so.
If you used a unique SE Linux identity for each Unix account then UBAC would prevent any user from accessing a file created by another user.
For my current policy that I am considering uploading to Debian/Unstable I have allowed the identity unconfined_u to access files owned by all identities. This means that unconfined_u is an identity for administrators, if I proceed on this path then I will grant the same rights to sysadm_u.
UBAC was not enabled in Fedora last time I checked, so I’m wondering whether there is any point in including it – I don’t feel obliged to copy everything that Fedora does, but there is some benefit in maintaining compatibility across distributions.
For protecting users from each other it seems that MCS (which is Mandatory in the Debian policy) is adequate. MCS allows a much better level of access control. For example I could assign categories c0 to c10 to a set of different projects and allow the person who manages all the projects to be assigned all those categories when they login. That user could then use the command “runcon -l s0:c1 bash” to start a shell for the purpose of managing files from project 1 and any file or process created by that command would have the category c1 and be prevented from writing to a file with a different category.
Of course the down-side to removing UBAC is that since RBAC was removed there is no other way of separating SE Linux users, while MCS is good for what it does it wasn’t designed for the purpose of isolating different types of user. So I’ll really want to get RBAC reinstalled before Squeeze is released if I remove UBAC.
Regardless of this I will need to get RBAC working on Squeeze eventually anyway. I’ve had a SE Linux Play Machine running with every release of SE Linux for the last 8 years and I don’t plan to stop now.Tags: Debian, Selinux