Linux, politics, and other interesting things
Debian/Squeeze (the next release of Debian) will be released some time later this year. Many people are already upgrading test servers, and development systems and workstations that are used to develop code that will be deployed next year. Also there are some significant new features in Squeeze that compel some people to upgrade production systems now (such as a newer version of KVM and Ext4 support).
I’ve started working on an upgrade plan for SE Linux. The first thing you want when upgrading between releases is a way of supporting booting a new kernel independently of the other parts of the upgrade. Either supporting the old user-space with the new kernel or the new kernel with the old user-space. It’s not that uncommon for a new kernel to have a problem when under load so it’s best to be able to back out of a kernel upgrade temporarily while trying to find the cause of the problem. For workstations and laptops it’s not uncommon to have a kernel upgrade not immediately work with some old hardware, this can usually be worked around without much effort, but it’s good to be able to keep systems running while waiting for a response to a support request.
deb http://www.coker.com.au lenny selinux
In Lenny the version of selinux-policy-default is 2:0.0.20080702-6. In the above APT repository I have version 2:0.0.20080702-18 which is needed if you want to run a 2.6.32 kernel. The main problem with the older policy is that the devtmpfs filesystem that is used by the kernel for /dev in the early stages of booting  is not known and therefore unlabeled – so most access to /dev is denied and booting fails. So before upgrading to testing or unstable it’s a really good idea to install the selinux-policy-default package from my Lenny repository and then run “selinux-policy-upgrade” to apply the new changes (by default upgrading the selinux-policy-default package doesn’t change the policy that is running – we consider the running policy to be configuration files that are not changed unless the user requests it).
There are also some other kernel changes which require policy changes such as a change to the way that access controls are applied to programs that trigger module load requests.
While some details of the policy are not yet finalised and there are some significant bugs remaining (in terms of usability not security) the policy in Unstable is usable. There is no need to rush an upgrade of the policy, so at this stage the policy in Unstable and Testing is more for testers than for serious production use.
But when you upgrade one thing you need to keep in mind is that we don’t to support upgrading the SE Linux policy between different major versions of Debian while in multi-user mode. The minimum requirement is that after the new policy package is installed you run the following commands and then reboot afterwards:
If achieving your security goals requires running SE Linux in enforcing mode all the time then you need to do this in single-user mode.
The changes to names of domains and labeling of files that are entry-points for domains is significant enough that it’s not practical to try and prove that all intermediate states of partial labeling are safe and that there are suitable aliases for all domains. Given that you need to reboot to install a new kernel anyway the reboot for upgrading the SE Linux policy shouldn’t be that much of an inconvenience. The relabel process on the first boot will take some time though.
In the original design SE Linux didn’t check open as a separate operation, only read/write etc. The reason for this is that the goal for SE Linux was to control information flows. The open() system call doesn’t transfer any data so there was no need to restrict access to it as a separate operation (but if you couldn’t read or write a file then an attempt to open it would fail). Recent versions of the SE Linux policy have added support for controlling file open, the reason for this is to allow a program in domain A to open a file and then let a program in domain B inherit the file handle and continue using the file even if it is not normally permitted to open the file – this matches the Unix semantics where a privileged process can allow an unprivileged child to inherit file handles or use Unix domain sockets to pass file handles to another process with different privileges.
SELinux: WARNING: inside open_file_mask_to_av with unknown mode:c1b6
Unfortunately when support was added for this a bug was discovered in the kernel, this post to the SE Linux mailing list has the conclusion to a discussion about it . The symptom of this problem is messages such as the above appearing in your kernel message log. I am not planning to build a kernel package for Lenny with a fix for this bug.
The command “dmesg -n 1” will prevent such messages from going to the system console – which is something you want to do if you plan to login at the console as they can occur often.Most Popular, Selinux