Linux, politics, and other interesting things
In 1996 Peter Gutmann wrote a paper titled “Secure Deletion of Data from Magnetic and Solid-State Memory” . In that paper he mentions the fact that the contents of RAM last longer at lower temperatures and suggests that data could be retained for weeks at a temperature of -60C or lower (while 140C causes rapid data loss). The paper also addresses issues of data recovery from hard drives, but given that adequate CPU power for encryption is available recovering data from a disk shouldn’t be an issue unless thee attacker can get the key to decrypt it or crack the algorithm – so disk recovery is not a hot issue at the moment.
Recently some researchers at Princeton University have published a paper describing in detail how to chill RAM to make it keep its data after a power cycle and even after being installed in a different computer . This attracted a lot of attention, while Peter’s paper described the theoretical concept (in great detail) the Princeton group showed how to implement the attack using materials that are commonly available.
Most of the analysis of this misses some fundamental points. Any suggestion that you can wipe the RAM on power failure or on boot misses the point entirely. If an attacker can chill a DIMM and then remove it from the system then there is no chance for it to be wiped. Maybe if you had security on the PC case to detect case opening (some servers have a basic version of this) such things would do a little good, but it shouldn’t be difficult to bypass in most cases.
Another common flawed analysis is to suggest that this is no big deal because sniffing the memory bus has been possible for years. While it has always been possible for government agencies and companies who design motherboards to sniff the bus, for most potential attackers it has been overly difficult.
When considering the effectiveness of a security system you should first consider what your threat model is. Who is going to attack you and what resources will they be willing and able to devote to the attack? An organisation that is prepared to use expensive equipment and highly trained people to break your encryption probably has other methods of gaining access to your secret data that are easier and cheaper.
The research from Princeton suggests that I could perform such attacks with my spare time and with equipment that is very cheap. I’ve been idly considering doing this to an old PC just for fun! Therefore I have to assume that everyone who has the same amount of skill and money as me can potentially compromise my data if they capture one of my machines.
It is still most likely that if anyone steals my laptop they will want to sell it and use the money to buy drugs. I don’t think that I have any data that is anywhere near valuable enough to justify a targeted mugging. But my procedures (in terms of changing passwords etc) in the case of my laptop being stolen now need to be scaled up due to the ease in which data might be compromised.
The best way of dealing with this would be to have the decryption keys locked inside the CPU (stored in registers or memory that’s locked in the CPU cache). The possibility of getting a modern CPU to operate at any temperature approaching -60C is laughable, and the CPU is a well contained package that can operate on its own and is difficult to attack. This would make things significantly more difficult for an attacker while requiring little effort (in fact it might be possible to lock data in the CPU cache already in which case a software change is all that is required).
Update: A comment by Mike made a good point about CPU cooling. Toms Hardware performed an overclocking experiment (from 3.2GHz to 5.25GHz) and used liquid nitrogen cooling . It might be possible to cool a CPU core to -60C in a reasonably small amount of time. But I still believe that it would raise the bar enough to make it worth doing.
Update2: Thanks Jaime for the spelling advice.