The Announcement
Late last month there was an announcement of a “severity 9.9 vulnerability” allowing remote code execution that affects “all GNU/Linux systems (plus others)” [1]. For something to affect all Linux systems that would have to be either a kernel issue or a sshd issue. The announcement included complaints about the lack of response of vendors and “And YES: I LOVE hyping the sh1t out of this stuff because apparently sensationalism is the only language that forces these people to fix”.
He seems to have a different experience to me of reporting bugs, I have had plenty of success getting bugs fixed without hyping them. I just report the bug, wait a while, and it gets fixed. I have reported potential security bugs without even bothering to try and prove that they were exploitable (any situation where you can make a program crash is potentially exploitable), I just report it and it gets fixed. I was very dubious about his ability to determine how serious a bug is and to accurately report it so this wasn’t a situation where I was waiting for it to be disclosed to discover if it affected me. I was quite confident that my systems wouldn’t be at any risk.
Analysis
Not All Linux Systems Run CUPS
When it was published my opinion was proven to be correct, it turned out to be a series of CUPS bugs [2]. To describe that as “all GNU/Linux systems (plus others)” seems like a vast overstatement, maybe a good thing to say if you want to be a TikTok influencer but not if you want to be known for computer security work.
For the Debian distribution the cups-browsed package (which seems to be the main exploitable one) is recommended by cups-daemon, as I have my Debian systems configured to not install recommended packages by default that means that it wasn’t installed on any of my systems. Also the vast majority of my systems don’t do printing and therefore don’t have any part of CUPS installed.
CUPS vs NAT
The next issue is that in Australia most home ISPs don’t have IPv6 enabled and CUPS doesn’t do the things needed to allow receiving connections from the outside world via NAT with IPv4. If inbound port 631 is blocked on both TCP and USP as is the default on Australian home Internet or if there is a correctly configured firewall in place then the network is safe from attack. There is a feature called uPnP port forwarding [3] to allow server programs to ask a router to send inbound connections to them, this is apparently usually turned off by default in router configuration. If it is enabled then there are Debian packages of software to manage this, the miniupnpc package has the client (which can request NAT changes on the router) [4]. That package is not installed on any of my systems and for my home network I don’t use a router that runs uPnP.
The only program I knowingly run that uses uPnP is Warzone2100 and as I don’t play network games that doesn’t happen. Also as an aside in version 4.4.2-1 of warzone2100 in Debian and Ubuntu I made it use Bubblewrap to run the game in a container. So a Remote Code Execution bug in Warzone 2100 won’t be an immediate win for an attacker (exploits via X11 or Wayland are another issue).
MAC Systems
Debian has had AppArmor enabled by default since Buster was released in 2019 [5]. There are claims that AppArmor will stop this exploit from doing anything bad.
To check SE Linux access I first use the “semanage fcontext” command to check the context of the binary, cupsd_exec_t means that the daemon runs as cupsd_t. Then I checked what file access is granted with the sesearch program, mostly just access to temporary files, cupsd config files, the faillog, the Kerberos cache files (not used on the Kerberos client systems I run), Samba run files (might be a possibility of exploiting something there), and the security_t used for interfacing with kernel security infrastructure. I then checked the access to the security class and found that it is permitted to check contexts and access-vectors – not access that can be harmful.
The next test was to use sesearch to discover what capabilities are granted, which unfortunately includes the sys_admin capability, that is a capability that allows many sysadmin tasks that could be harmful (I just checked the Fedora source and Fedora 42 has the same access). Whether the sys_admin capability can be used to do bad things with the limited access cupsd_t has to device nodes etc is not clear. But this access is undesirable.
So the SE Linux policy in Debian and Fedora will stop cupsd_t from writing SETUID programs that can be used by random users for root access and stop it from writing to /etc/shadow etc. But the sys_admin capability might allow it to do hostile things and I have already uploaded a changed policy to Debian/Unstable to remove that. The sys_rawio capability also looked concerning but it’s apparently needed to probe for USB printers and as the domain has no access to block devices it is otherwise harmless. Below are the commands I used to discover what the policy allows and the output from them.
# semanage fcontext -l|grep bin/cups-browsed
/usr/bin/cups-browsed regular file system_u:object_r:cupsd_exec_t:s0
# sesearch -A -s cupsd_t -c file -p write
allow cupsd_t cupsd_interface_t:file { append create execute execute_no_trans getattr ioctl link lock map open read rename setattr unlink write };
allow cupsd_t cupsd_lock_t:file { append create getattr ioctl link lock open read rename setattr unlink write };
allow cupsd_t cupsd_log_t:file { append create getattr ioctl link lock open read rename setattr unlink write };
allow cupsd_t cupsd_runtime_t:file { append create getattr ioctl link lock open read rename setattr unlink write };
allow cupsd_t cupsd_rw_etc_t:file { append create getattr ioctl link lock open read rename setattr unlink write };
allow cupsd_t cupsd_t:file { append create getattr ioctl link lock open read rename setattr unlink write };
allow cupsd_t cupsd_tmp_t:file { append create getattr ioctl link lock open read rename setattr unlink write };
allow cupsd_t faillog_t:file { append getattr ioctl lock open read write };
allow cupsd_t init_tmpfs_t:file { append getattr ioctl lock read write };
allow cupsd_t krb5_host_rcache_t:file { append create getattr ioctl link lock open read rename setattr unlink write }; [ allow_kerberos ]:True
allow cupsd_t print_spool_t:file { append create getattr ioctl link lock open read relabelfrom relabelto rename setattr unlink write };
allow cupsd_t samba_var_t:file { append getattr ioctl lock open read write };
allow cupsd_t security_t:file { append getattr ioctl lock open read write };
allow cupsd_t security_t:file { append getattr ioctl lock open read write }; [ allow_kerberos ]:True
allow cupsd_t usbfs_t:file { append getattr ioctl lock open read write };
# sesearch -A -s cupsd_t -c security
allow cupsd_t security_t:security check_context; [ allow_kerberos ]:True
allow cupsd_t security_t:security { check_context compute_av };
# sesearch -A -s cupsd_t -c capability
allow cupsd_t cupsd_t:capability net_bind_service; [ allow_ypbind ]:True
allow cupsd_t cupsd_t:capability { audit_write chown dac_override dac_read_search fowner fsetid ipc_lock kill net_bind_service setgid setuid sys_admin sys_rawio sys_resource sys_tty_config };
# sesearch -A -s cupsd_t -c capability2
allow cupsd_t cupsd_t:capability2 { block_suspend wake_alarm };
# sesearch -A -s cupsd_t -c blk_file
Conclusion
This is an example of how not to handle security issues. Some degree of promotion is acceptable but this is very excessive and will result in people not taking security announcements seriously in future. I wonder if this is even a good career move by the researcher in question, will enough people believe that they actually did something good in this that it outweighs the number of people who think it’s misleading at best?