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SE Linux and Decrypted Data

There is currently a discussion on the Debian-security mailing list about how to protect data which came from an encrypted file. I was going to skip that one until someone summoned me by mentioning SE Linux.

The issue which was raised is that data from an encrypted file can be read from /dev/mem (for all memory of the machine) or /proc/<pid>/mem (for the memory of the process). It was suggested that SE Linux can prevent such attacks, however it’s not that simple.

In most SE Linux configurations there will be a domain with ultimate privileges, examples are unconfined_t for a default configuration (also known as targeted) and sysadm_t for a “strict” configuration. SE Linux differs from many security models (such as the Unix permissions model that we are familiar with) in that there is no inherent requirement for a domain with ultimate privileges. I have in the past written policy for machines in which no domain could read /dev/mem or modify the running policy. This meant that booting from installation media might be required to modify the configuration of the system – some people desire systems like this and have good reasons for doing so!

As the vast majority of SE Linux users will have a “targeted” configuration, and the majority of the rest will have a “strict” configuration with minimal changes (IE sysadm_t will work as expected) there will always be a domain that can access /dev/mem (I’m not certain that sysadm_t can directly access /dev/mem on all variants of the policy – but given that it can put SE Linux in permissive mode it has ultimate access to work around that).

This however doesn’t mean that SE Linux provides no benefit. A typical Linux system will have many daemons running as root, while a typical SE Linux system will have few processes running as root while also having a SE Linux context that grants ultimate privileges. The root owned processes that SE Linux constrains are generally the network facing daemons and other processes which provide a risk, while the root owned processes that are not constrained by SE Linux policy are generally processes related to early stages of the system boot and programs run as part of the system administrator’s login session – processes that are inherently trusted.

Now regarding the memory of the process (and the ptrace API), in most cases a process that is likely to be accessing such a file will run in a domain that permits such access to itself. If the process in question is run from a login session (ssh login etc) then other processes in the same session will have access to the data. It is quite possible to write policy to create a new domain for the program which accesses the decrypted data and to deny the domain the ability to ptrace itself, but it will require at least 10 minutes of work (it’s not a default configuration).

So while SE Linux will generally help you to improve your security no matter what your exact requirements may be, it’s not something that can be used to make such corner cases entirely disappear. In a more general sense the idea that only a single program can access certain data is almost unattainable in a typical system. Among other things to consider is the fact that the Linux kernel is one of the larger programs on a typical Linux system…

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