Chris Samual writes a good summary of Peter Gutmann’s analysis of the cost of Vista (in terms of DRM).

The following paragraph in the article however seemed more interesting to me:
Once a weakness is found in a particular driver or device, that driver will have its signature revoked by Microsoft, which means that it will cease to function (details on this are a bit vague here, presumably some minimum functionality like generic 640×480 VGA support will still be available in order for the system to boot). This means that a report of a compromise of a particular driver or device will cause all support for that device worldwide to be turned off until a fix can be found.

Now just imagine that you want to cause widespread disruption – a DOS (Denial Of Service) attack against Windows users. What better option than to cause most of them to have hardware that’s not acceptable to the OS? I expect that there will be many instances of security holes in drivers and hardware being concealed by MS because they can’t afford the PR problems resulting from making millions of machines cease functioning. But just imagine that someone finds hardware vulnerabilities in a couple of common graphics drivers or pieces of hardware and publicly releases exploits shortly before a major holiday. If it’s public enough (EG posted to a few mailing lists and faxed to some major newspapers) then MS would be forced to invoke the DRM measures or lose face in a significant way. Just imagine the results of stopping 1/3 of machines working just before Christmas!

Of course after the first few incidents people will learn. It shouldn’t be difficult to configure a firewall to prevent all access to MS servers so that they can’t revoke access, after all our PCs are important enough to us that we don’t want some jerk in Redmond just turning them off. Of course disabling connections to MS would also disable security updates – but we all know that usability is more important than security to the vast majority of users (witness the number of people who happily keep using a machine that they know to be infected with a virus or trojan).

If this happens and firewalling MS servers becomes a common action, I wonder if MS will attempt the typical malware techniques of using servers in other countries with random port numbers to get past firewalls. Maybe Windows updates could be spread virally between PCs, this method would allow infecting machines that aren’t connected to the net via laptops.

Finally, I recommend that people who are interested in such things read Eastern Standard Tribe by Cory Doctorow, he has some interesting ideas about people DOSing corporations that they work for which seem surprisingly similar to what MS is doing to itself. I’ll post about my own observations of corporations DOSing themselves in the near future.

On a mailing list some questions were asked about disk encryption, I decided to blog the answer for the benefit of others:

What type of encryption would be the strongest? the uncrackable if you will? im not interested in DES as this is a US govt recommendation – IDEA seems good but what kernel module implements this?

The US government (which incidentally employs some of the best cryptologists in the world) recommends encryption methods for data that is important to US interests (US military and banking operations for starters). Why wouldn’t you want to follow those recommendations? Do you think that they are putting back-doors in their own systems?

If they were putting in back-doors do you think that they would use them (and potentially reveal their methods) for something as unimportant as your data?

I think that if the US military wanted to apply a serious effort to breaking the encryption on your data then you would have an assortment of other things to worry about, most of which would be more important to you than the integrity of your data.

I’ve read some good things about keeping a usb key for system boot so that anything on the computer itself is unreadable without the key – but thats simply just a physical object – I’d like both the system to ask for the passphrase for the key as well as needing the usb key

I believe that can be done with LUKS, however it seemed broken last time I experimented with it so I’ve stuck with the older operation of cryptsetup.

What kind of overheads does something like this entangle? – will my system crawl because of the constant IO load of the disk?

My laptop has a Pentium-M 1.7GHz and a typical laptop drive. The ratio of CPU power to hard drive speed is reasonable. For most operations I don’t notice the overhead of encryption, the only problem is when performing CPU intensive IO operations (such as bzip compression of large files). When an application and the kernel both want to use a lot of CPU time then things can get slow.

More recent machines have a much higher ratio of CPU power to disk IO as CPU technology has been advancing much faster than disk technology. A high-end desktop system might have 2-3x the IO capacity
of my machine, but a single core would have 2-3x the computer power of the CPU in my laptop and for any system you might desire nowadays 2 cores is the minimum. Single-core machines are still on sale and still work well for many people – I am still deploying Pentium-3 machines in new installations, but for machines that make people drool it’s all dual-core in laptops and one or two dual-core CPUs in desktop systems (with quad core CPUs on sale soon).

If you want to encrypt data on a P3 system with a RAID array (EG a P3 server) then you should expect some performance loss. But for a typical modern desktop system you shouldn’t expect to notice any overhead.

In a comment on my post more about securing an office someone suggested using biometrics. The positive aspect of biometrics is that they can’t be lost, no-one is accidentally going to leave a finger or an eye in their car while they go to a party while other authentication devices are regularly lost in such a manner.

The down-side is that having your finger or eye stolen would be a lot less pleasant than having a USB device, swipe-card, key, or other security device stolen. I think that it’s good to have an option of surrendering your key when under threat (for the person who might be attacked at least).

Rumor has it that some biometric sensors look for signs of life (EG temperature and pulse), but I believe that these could be faked with a suitable amount of effort. A finger attached to a mini heart/lung machine should make it possible to pass the temperature and pulse checks (although I don’t think that I have access to any data that is important enough to justify such effort on the part of an attacker).

One thing that biometrics could be useful for is screen-blankers. It would be good to be able to have a screen-blanker for your computer that operates when you go to get a coffee. For a period of 10 minutes after leaving a biometric method could be used to re-enable access. After that time a different method would ave to be used. This gives the convenience of biometrics for when you need it most (the many short trips away from your computer that you make during the day) but removes the benefit for an attacker who might consider removing part of your body. Also I am not convinced in the general security of biometrics. There are claims that you can make a finger based on a fingerprint which can fool a biometric sensor. If those claims are correct then a biometric sensor would still work for a coffee break (presumably you are not far away and will be back soon, and other people are in the area). The coffee break security is usually to prevent casual snooping such as colleagues who want to see what was on your screen but not actually do anything invasive to get it. Another benefit of biometrics for a screen saver is that although I trust people in the same office as me (whichever office that may be) not to try anything when they might get caught I still don’t want them shoulder-surfing my password. Replacing the trivial authentication cases with a fingerprint reader would prevent that.

In the KDE 1.x days I had a shell script launched when the lid closed on my laptop which would lock the screen (the screen-saver ran in the background and a signal could make it lock the screen). This meant that I could merely close the lid of my laptop to lock the screen, this is fast and easy and also is not immediately recognised as locking the screen. Some people get offended if you lock your laptop screen when in their presence as they think that you should trust them enough to leave your most secret data open to them (generally people who aren’t serious about computers – I’m sure that the same people would happily lock their diary if I was ever in the same room as it). Being able to lock the screen in a non-obvious way is a security benefit.

Regarding the comment about using a USB device to store passwords, there are two problems with this, one is that all passwords will be available all the time, this means a program that is permitted to access password A would also be given access to password B. The other is that the passwords can be accessed easily. The ideal solution is to have an encryption device that uses public key cryptography and stores the private keys on the device with no way of removing them. It would also permit the user to authorise each transaction.

I would like to see a USB device that stores multiple GPG keys and implements the GPG algorithm (with no way for anyone with less resources than the NSA to extract the keys). The device would have a display and a couple of buttons. When it is accessed it would display messages such as “signing attempt on key 1” and allow me to press a button to authorise or reject that operation.

This means that if I insert the key to sign an email I won’t have a background trojan start issuing sign and decrypt commands. The only viable attack that would be permitted is the case where I want to sign a message and my message is sent to /dev/null and a message from an attacker is signed again. The non-arrival of my original message would hopefully alert me to this problem. I am not aware of any hardware which supports these functions.

Also I have just received a couple of RSA SecurID tokens as a sample. An RSA representative phoned me to ask about my use of the tokens, I said that I am an independent consultant and I have been having trouble getting my clients to accept my recommendations to use such devices and that I want to implement them on a test network so that I can give more detailed advice to my clients and hopefully get them to improve their security. For some reason the RSA rep found that funny, but I got my sample hardware so it’s fine.