etbe - Russell Coker

I have written a script named postfix-nochroot to disable the chroot functionality of Postfix. I plan to initially include this in the selinux-basics package in Debian, but if the script was adopted by the Postfix package or some other package that seems more appropriate then I would remove it from selinux-basics.
The reason for disabling [...]

I have written a script for Debian named selinux-activate which is included in selinux-basics version 0.3.3+nmu1 (which I have uploaded to Debian/Unstable). The script when run with no parameters will change the GRUB configuration to include selinux=1 on the kernel command-line and enable SE Linux support in the PAM modules for login, gdm, and [...]

Currently Debian/Lenny contains all packages needed to run SE Linux apart from the policy. The policy package is missing because it needs to sit in unstable for a while before migrating to testing (Lenny), and I keep fixing bugs and uploading new versions.
I have set up my own APT repository for SE Linux packages [...]

SE Linux is almost ready to use in Lenny. Currently I am waiting on the packages libsepol1 version 2.0.30-2, policycoreutils 2.0.49-3, and selinux-policy-default version 0.0.20080702-4 to make their way to testing. The first two should get there soon, the policy will take a little longer as I just made a new upload today [...]

One of the most significant tasks performed by a SE Linux system is loading the “policy“. The policy is the set of rules which determine what actions are permitted by each domain.
When I first started using SE Linux (in 2001) the kernel knew where to find the policy file and would just read the [...]

I have just uploaded new SE Linux policy packages for Debian/Unstable which will go into Lenny (provided that the FTP masters approve the new packages in time).
The big change is that there are no longer separate packages for strict and targeted policies. There is now a package named selinux-policy-default which has the features of [...]

In May 2002 I had an idea for securing access to GNUPG [1]. What I did was to write SE Linux policy to only permit the gpg program to access the secret key (and other files in ~/.gnupg). This meant that the most trivial ways of stealing the secret key would be prevented. [...]

When discussing the machine there are two common comments I get. One is a suggestion that I am putting myself at risk, I think that the risk of visiting random web sites is significantly greater. Another is a challenge to put the machine on my internal network if I really trust SE Linux, as noted I have made mistakes in the past and there have been Linux kernel bugs - but apart from that it’s always best to have multiple layers of protection.

My SE Linux Play Machine has been online again since the 18th of March.

On Monday the 11th of Feb I took it offline after a user managed to change the password for my own account. Part of the problem was the way /bin/passwd determines whether it should change a password.

My Etch back-port repository of SE Linux related packages (which I documented in a previous post) now has a complete set of packages for AMD64. From now on I aim to make AMD64 and i386 be my main supported platforms for SE Linux development.