25 Aug
In a comment on my AppArmor is dead post [1] someone complained that SE Linux is not “Unixish“.
The security model in Unix is almost exclusively Discretionary Access Control (DAC) [2]. This means that any process that owns a resource can grant access to the resource to other processes without restriction. For example a [...]
Posted in Security by: etbe
1 Comment
19 Aug
A large part of the disagreement about the way to manage the policy seems to be based on who will be the primary “owner” of the policy on the machine. This isn’t a problem that only applies to SE Linux, the same issue applies for various types of configuration files and scripts throughout the [...]
Posted in Security by: etbe
3 Comments
18 Aug
Caleb Case (Ubuntu contributer and Tresys employee) has written about the benefits of using separate packages for SE Linux policy modules [1].
Firstly I think it’s useful to consider some other large packages that could be split into multiple packages. The first example that springs to mind is coreutils which used to be textutils, shellutils, [...]
Posted in Security by: etbe
10 Comments
04 Aug
I have been asked about the current status of Lenny SE Linux on the Desktop.
The first thing to consider is the combinations of policies and configurations. I will number them if only for the purpose of this post, if the numbering is considered generally helpful it could be more widely adopted to describe configurations.
Default [...]
Posted in Security by: etbe
2 Comments
02 Aug
When I first packaged the SE Linux policy for Debian the only way to adjust the policy was to edit the source files and recompile. Often changes that you might desire involved changing macros so while it would have been theoretically possible to just tack a few type definitions and allow rules at the [...]
Posted in Security by: etbe
No Comments
02 Aug
I have written a script named postfix-nochroot to disable the chroot functionality of Postfix. I plan to initially include this in the selinux-basics package in Debian, but if the script was adopted by the Postfix package or some other package that seems more appropriate then I would remove it from selinux-basics.
The reason for disabling [...]
Posted in Security by: etbe
2 Comments
01 Aug
I have written a script for Debian named selinux-activate which is included in selinux-basics version 0.3.3+nmu1 (which I have uploaded to Debian/Unstable). The script when run with no parameters will change the GRUB configuration to include selinux=1 on the kernel command-line and enable SE Linux support in the PAM modules for login, gdm, and [...]
Posted in Security by: etbe
5 Comments
31 Jul
Currently Debian/Lenny contains all packages needed to run SE Linux apart from the policy. The policy package is missing because it needs to sit in unstable for a while before migrating to testing (Lenny), and I keep fixing bugs and uploading new versions.
I have set up my own APT repository for SE Linux packages [...]
Posted in Security by: etbe
5 Comments
29 Jul
SE Linux is almost ready to use in Lenny. Currently I am waiting on the packages libsepol1 version 2.0.30-2, policycoreutils 2.0.49-3, and selinux-policy-default version 0.0.20080702-4 to make their way to testing. The first two should get there soon, the policy will take a little longer as I just made a new upload today [...]
Posted in Security by: etbe
4 Comments
24 Jul
One of the most significant tasks performed by a SE Linux system is loading the “policy“. The policy is the set of rules which determine what actions are permitted by each domain.
When I first started using SE Linux (in 2001) the kernel knew where to find the policy file and would just read the [...]
Posted in Security by: etbe
No Comments